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Innovation from external sources has continued to grow in importance in recent years, in 
defiance of conventional wisdom advocating internal sourcing of core technologies. 
One important reason for the previous emphasis on internal sourcing of core technologies relates 
to concerns of horizontal and vertical appropriability. Thus the question arises of whether and 
how firms can reconcile horizontal and vertical appropriability with the rise of the external 
sourcing of new technologies. Must firms sacrifice value appropriation on the altar of value 
creation? 
To answer these questions, we delve beneath individual technological innovations to examine the 
technical and market capabilities underlying them. Specifically, we show how the amount of 
value a firm stands to appropriate relative to competitors and relative to technology suppliers 
depends on the fit between its innovation strategy and its previous investments in distinct 
dimensions of absorptive capacity. At the same time, we also show how first-order capabilities 
and dynamic capabilities interact to determine firm performance. Thus we shed light on how and 
when the move to “open” innovation will affect the amount of value innovating firms stand to 
appropriate.  
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Innovation from external sources is on the rise. As markets for technology have appeared and 
flourished (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001), “open innovation” has been promoted as a 
new paradigm for successful innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). Thus managers are increasingly 
accepting “that useful knowledge is widely distributed, and that even the most capable R&D 
organizations must identify, connect to, and leverage external knowledge sources as a core 
process in innovation” (Chesbrough, 2006: 1). 
One recent study, for example, found that an average of 45% of innovation came from external 
sources, ranging from 30% in pharmaceutical and chemical organizations, to as high as 90% in 
some retail companies (Linder, Jarvenpaa, and Davenport, 2003). In addition, while half of the 
executives surveyed believed that innovation from external sources would rise in the following 
three years, not a single one felt that it would decline (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, one important reason for the previous emphasis on internal sourcing of core 
technologies can be found in concerns about horizontal and vertical appropriability. 
Conventional wisdom was that research in an organization’s area of core expertise should stay 
in-house, while outsiders could only provide less important support activities. Yet businesses 
are now “using external sources for all phases of innovation, from discovery and development 
to commercialization and even product maintenance” (ibid: 44). What then happens to 
horizontal appropriability when firms source for new technologies in the same markets as their 
competitors? 
In addition, according to strategic factor market theory, firms cannot profit from external 
resources unless they have superior expectations or are beneficiaries of good fortune (Barney, 
1986). This suggests that vertical appropriability should be a problem for firms searching for 
valuable new technologies outside their borders. In other words, if expertise at the 
technological frontier has migrated beyond firm boundaries, how can firms have superior 
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expectations for such technologies, when they sometimes do not even know about their 
existence until suppliers offer them for sale? 
Thus the question arises of whether and how firms can reconcile horizontal and vertical 
appropriability with the rise of the external sourcing of new technologies. Must firms sacrifice 
value appropriation on the altar of value creation? How can firms appropriate superior value 
relative to suppliers and competitors, when they innovate based on external technology? 
To answer these questions, we delve beneath individual technological innovations to examine 
the technical and market capabilities underlying them. Specifically, we focus on the dynamic 
capabilities through which firms acquire, assimilate, transform and exploit new technologies, as 
well as the technological and market domains across which they leverage innovations. 
In doing so, we build on the recent “bargaining perspective on resource advantage” (Lippman 
and Rumelt, 2003a) which integrates cooperative game theory into the resource-based view of 
the firm. In this approach, firms are seen as coalitions of co-specialized resources and 
capabilities, and value appropriation is the outcome of bargaining over surplus created between 
resources exhibiting some degree of complementarity. We also draw on Adegbesan (2005) who 
extends strategic factor market theory, using the bargaining perspective to account for 
situations (such as technological sourcing) where resource buyers display varying degrees of 
complementarity to target resources. 
We thus show how the amount of value a firm stands to appropriate relative to competitors and 
relative to technology suppliers depends on the fit between its innovation strategy and its 
previous investments in distinct dimensions of absorptive capacity. At the same time, we also 
show how first-order capabilities and dynamic capabilities interact to determine firm 
performance. Thus we shed light on how and when the move to “open” innovation will affect 
the amount of value innovating firms stand to appropriate. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the literature 
related to technology sourcing and value appropriation. Following this we present a resource-
based model of technological innovation, with the external sourcing of technology for 
innovation as one case of this general phenomenon. We then use the model to develop a 
capability-based typology of technological innovation, before going on to develop our theory 
relating innovation strategy and absorptive capacity to value appropriation. After deriving 
some falsifiable propositions, we discuss the implications, limitations, and extensions of the 
paper, before concluding. 
Value Appropriation and the Performance Impact of Technological 
Innovation 
The need for a focus on the amount of value appropriated from technological innovation has 
recently become more pressing (McEvily, Eisenhardt, and Prescott, 2004). Scholars as well as 
managers are increasingly concerned as “evidence is growing that innovation processes in 
many industries are not yielding the benefits they should” (Linder et al., 2003: 43). Even though 
measures of innovativeness have increased, economic performance has not improved 
correspondingly (Kandybin and Kihn, 2004; Linder et al., 2003). Consequently it is likely that 
many innovators are not capturing much of the value created by their innovations.  
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“The key determinant of the profitability of an innovation to the innovator is the share of the 
value created by that innovation, that the innovator is able to appropriate” (Grant, 2002: 335). 
It is therefore important to have a better understanding of the determinants of the amount of 
value an innovator stands to appropriate from successful technological innovation. 
Technology Sourcing and Value Appropriation 
Value appropriation acquires even greater importance in view of the recent growth in the 
external sourcing of technology for innovation. As technological change has accelerated, and 
the number and mobility of knowledge workers (along with their access to venture capital) has 
reached unprecedented levels, firms have come to depend more and more on knowledge 
developed beyond their borders (Quinn, 2000; Robertson and Gatignon, 1998; Veugelers, 1997). 
The growth of markets for technology has given firms more options for the external acquisition 
of new technology to embody in products and processes (Arora et al., 2001). 
Firms that open up to external technology inflows can access a greater variety of innovative ideas 
more speedily, and thus cope better with technological change (Chesbrough, 2003; Rigby and Zook, 
2002; Rothaermel, 2001). External sourcing allows firms to share the risks and costs of R&D, while 
exploiting complementarities between internal and external knowledge (Arora and Gambardella, 
1994; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). By providing faster access to new technologies, external 
sourcing also helps firms to speed up their innovation development process, and can help to 
stimulate internal innovativeness (Robertson and Gatignon, 1998; Veugelers, 1997). Thus it is no 
surprise that firms are increasingly seeking inputs to the innovation process from beyond their 
borders. In fact managers and scholars are urged to embrace a new paradigm of “open innovation” 
(Chesbrough, 2003) or “open-market innovation” (Rigby and Zook, 2002) in response to the new 
competitive environment (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, and West, 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
Nevertheless the advantages of external technology are not a new discovery, as the study of the 
pros and cons of external sourcing goes back at least as far as von Hippel (1982) and Williamson 
(1985). Along with the above-cited advantages, previous work has uncovered considerable 
disadvantages, such as higher transaction costs, weaker seller incentives, supplier opportunism 
and the threat of hold-up, increased ease of duplication by competitors, and “indigestibility” of 
external technology (e.g. Ghemawat, 1991; Pisano, 1990; Reuer and Koza, 2000; Robertson and 
Gatignon, 1998; Williamson, 1985). In particular, the issue of appropriability looms large 
(Ghemawat, 1991). Horizontally, firms that depend on external sourcing are often unable to 
prevent competitors from accessing such technologies as well (Ghemawat, 1986; Levin, Klevorick, 
Nelson, and Winter, 1987). Vertically, unless firms have better foresight than technology 
suppliers, all the potential value to be created will be anticipated in the technology’s purchase 
price (Barney, 1986; Makadok and Barney, 2001). 
Thus it is puzzling that so little work has looked at what the increased emphasis on external 
sourcing portends for value appropriation (West, 2006). The many advantages of an “open 
innovation” paradigm simultaneously lead to increased concerns about the appropriability of 
value created when firms innovate based on externally sourced technology. When firms open 
up their borders to external inflows and outflows, competitors, suppliers, customers, and 
complementors can all lay claim to a portion of value created (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 
1996; Teece, 1987). How then can firms ensure they appropriate a substantial part of the value 
created when they embody external technologies in innovative products? Or is weakened 
appropriability a reality firms have to accept as the price for increased innovativeness?  
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Inimitability and Value Appropriation 
Research on the appropriability of value created by technological innovation has been strongly 
influenced by David Teece’s seminal paper. In explaining the failure of innovative firms, Teece 
argued that under a “weak appropriability regime,” “markets don’t work well, and the profits 
from innovation may accrue to the owners of certain complementary assets, rather than to the 
developers of the intellectual property” (Teece, 1987: 185). According to Teece, the strength of 
the “appropriability regime” is a function of the legal mechanisms available to protect 
innovation, and the knowledge characteristics of the underlying technology (ibid.); and thus it 
is a measure of the imitability of the innovation. As such, value appropriation depends on the 
ability to prevent imitation or replication of an innovation, barring which the critical 
determinant becomes the ability to achieve a superior position in the required complementary 
assets for commercializing the innovation (ibid.). 
Studies by scholars in the economic tradition have highlighted different legal mechanisms for 
avoiding imitation, as well as their relative effectiveness (e.g. Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; 
Levin et al., 1987; Winter, 2000a). In this line of work, “perfect appropriability” is equated with 
“monopoly of the invention” (Levin et al., 1987: 783); and “appropriation mechanisms” studied 
include patents, trade secrets, trademarks, and copyrights; as well as other factors such as lead time, 
and plain secrecy (Arora, Ceccagnoli, and Cohen, 2003; Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987). 
Scholars in this area have shown that the relative effectiveness of each of these mechanisms varies 
widely across industries as well as across product or process innovations (ibid.). 
Other scholars have looked at the second factor affecting Teece’s “appropriability regime”: the 
characteristics of the underlying technology. Burgelman, Maidique, and Wheelwright (2001: 4) 
define technology as “the theoretical and practical knowledge, skills, and artefacts that can be 
used to develop products and services as well as their production and delivery systems.” Thus 
the knowledge characteristics of the new technology underlying an innovation can impede 
imitation (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Reed and DeFillipi, 1990). Specifically, the imitability of an 
innovation depends on its degree of social and/or technical complexity and its resource- or 
context-specificity; as well as on whether its underlying knowledge is tacit or codified, 
observable or non-observable in use, and whether or not it requires tangible assets for 
deployment (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Maritan and Brush, 2003; McEvily and Chakravarthy, 
2002; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Polanyi, 1962; Szulanski, 1996; Teece, 2003). 
Nonetheless, applying these insights to innovation based on externally sourced new 
technologies causes at least three problems. Firstly, most current work focuses on the ability 
of the technology supplier to appropriate value from a new technology. Under the paradigm of 
“closed innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003) it was relatively uncommon for firms to innovate based 
on external technologies. On the other hand, in a paradigm of “open innovation” (Chesbrough 
et al., 2006) we also need to examine whether and how a firm that embodies external 
technologies in new products and/or processes can appropriate a significant share of the value 
thus created. 
Secondly, the emphasis on inimitability addresses horizontal appropriability, while neglecting 
vertical appropriability somewhat. When firms innovate based on externally sourced technology, 
there remains the possibility of upstream “hold-up” (Ghemawat, 1991) by technology suppliers. 
Thus monopoly can no longer be equated to “perfect appropriability.”
1 In one study for example, 
                                              
1 Work by Coff and others (Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 2005; Coff, 1999; Coff and Lee, 2003) shows that even without 
external sourcing, firms can still be held up by “internal suppliers.”  
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Caves, Crookell, and Killing (1983: 258) found that bargaining and “dubiously appropriating 
variables” accounted for up to 50% of payments to upstream suppliers. On the downstream end, 
Kreps (1990: 314-315)
2 has pointed out that the assumption that a monopoly can extract all the 
value created from consumers is not unassailable. 
Finally, with open innovation firms cannot count on the ability to exclude competitors from 
externally sourced new technologies, making inimitability even more difficult. Thus innovating 
firms may have to focus on the complementary capabilities that enable them to profit more 
than rivals from technological innovation. As such, we need to look beyond the innovative 
technologies and products in question, to the underlying capabilities by means of which they 
are molded and leveraged across multiple domains. Additionally, since value appropriation 
results from simultaneous vertical and horizontal competition involving innovating firms, 
buyers, and suppliers, its analysis requires a theoretical approach capable of handling this 
multi-level plurality of stakeholders, as well as an emphasis on firm-level performance 
outcomes. For these two reasons, we turn to a recent extension of the resource-based view of 
the firm. 
Value Appropriation and the Bargaining Perspective on Resource Advantage 
The resource-based view (RBV) conceptualizes firms as bundles or coalitions of resources, 
assuming that firms within an industry might be heterogeneous with respect to the strategic 
resources they control, and that these resources may not be perfectly mobile across firms 
(Barney, 1991; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a; Peteraf, 1993). A defining feature of the RBV is 
that it gives “an efficiency-based explanation of performance differences, rather than one 
relying purely on market power, collusion, or ‘strategic’ behaviours” (Peteraf and Barney, 2003: 
311). As such “performance differences are viewed as derived from rent differentials, 
attributable to resources having intrinsically different levels of efficiency” (Peteraf and Barney, 
2003: 311; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). 
One of the least developed areas of the RBV however, relates to the conditions under which 
firms can appropriate value created by the combination and deployment of resources (Coff, 
1999; Denrell, Fang, and Winter, 2003; Hoopes, Madsen, and Walker, 2003). Despite the fact 
that value appropriation is critical to the RBV’s interest in explaining why firms in the same 
industry vary systematically in performance over time (Hoopes et al., 2003), “rent appropriation 
is an under-researched area at the core of the resource-based view and the strategy literature” 
(Coff and Lee, 2003: 183-184). 
Lippman and Rumelt (2003a, b) hold that this and other issues can be better addressed by 
integrating cooperative game theory into the micro-foundations of the RBV. According to them, 
theoretical researchers in competitive strategy have developed the RBV upon the micro-
foundations
3 of standard neoclassical economics (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a). Nevertheless 
when resources exhibit varying degrees of complementarity (as in external technology sourcing), 
the relative demand and supply of sellers and buyers along with the various combinatorial 
possibilities, create a complex situation that standard neoclassical economics-based approaches 
cannot handle (Denrell et al., 2003; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a, b; Makowski and Ostroy, 2001). 
                                              
2 Cited in Brandenburger and Stuart (2003). 
3 “The micro-foundations of a subject are the definitions of its basic elements and the allowable operations that can 
be performed using these elements” (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b: 903).  
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Since such conditions are among those of greatest interest to researchers in the RBV, they propose 
a “bargaining perspective on resource advantage” (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a), built on the 
foundations of a “payments perspective” (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b). 
In this approach, rents appear as negotiated payments for the services of scarce valuable 
resources. The bargaining perspective “separates the issues of opportunity cost, value, and the 
distribution of rents,” providing “a formal system in which surplus is known, but its division is 
subject to negotiation” (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a: 1070). Firms are seen as coalitions of 
resources and “no resource is ‘firm specific.’” Instead “there are co-specialized resources that 
exist within the legal shell of the firm” such that “bargaining parties are not firms or products, 
but rather the individual resources that lie behind them” (ibid.). The division of surplus is 
formally indeterminate and will be determined by the relative values created by different use 
combinations of resources. Thus at the heart of this approach is bargaining over the sharing of 
surplus created by resource combination. 
This synthesis is both elegant and effective, because while solution concepts from cooperative 
game theory provide an excellent approach for studying the division of surplus, the RBV’s 
focus on resource advantage highlights the impact of resource endowments on this division. 
Nevertheless one should point out that cooperative game theory had already been fruitfully 
used in strategy research. Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) were the first to import the 
coalitional approach into strategic management, and they showed it to be a powerful tool for 
analyzing value appropriation issues. Recent usage of coalitional models in strategy can also be 
found in papers by MacDonald and Ryall (2003; 2004), Brandenburger and Stuart (2004), and 
Stuart (2001) among others. 
In this paper we build on the bargaining perspective to conceptualize technological innovation 
as the outcome of the combination of resources and capabilities with some degree of co-
specialization. When technological innovation is based on externally sourced technology, there 
will be coalitional bargaining over the surplus created, resulting in differential value 
appropriation. Using the theory developed by Adegbesan (2005), we then relate the learning 
characteristics of the innovation and firms’ absorptive capacity endowments to individual firms’ 
bargaining positions, and thus to the amount of value they stand to appropriate. 
In the next section we present a resource-based model of technological innovation, and 
introduce a classification of a firm’s innovation strategy. With that done, we then proceed to 
the analysis of the determinants of the amount of value appropriated from technological 
innovation based on externally sourced technology. 
A Resource-based Model of Technological Innovation 
Innovation is the embodiment of new approaches to doing business in products/services and/or 
their production and delivery systems (Burgelman et al., 2001; Grant, 2002). However, these 
“new approaches” may have different foci. Thus an innovation’s novelty may arise from “new 
approaches” to technology, firm organization, financing, or business models, embodied in 
products or processes. Consequently innovation can be technological, organizational, financial, 
or may relate to business concepts/models (Drucker, 1985; Grant, 2002; Hamel, 2000; Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1999; Markides, 1997), to name a few possibilities. 
In this line, we define technological innovation as the embodiment of technical advances or 
new technologies in products and/or their production and delivery systems. As technical  
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advancement has quickened, firms have increasingly sought to create enhanced value through 
the embodiment of new technologies in products and processes. Thus technological innovation 
is not just the commercialization of new technologies, but innovation, where the focus of the 
novelty is technological. In other words, while technological innovation for a microprocessor 
manufacturer might involve the production of some new advanced semiconductor chip, 
technological innovation for a bank might involve using new technologies to provide clients 
with rich financial information via their mobile phones. For this reason, it is not confined to 
“high technology” industries but is, in Drucker’s words, “as important to a bank, an insurance 
company or a retail store, as it is to a manufacturing or engineering business” (Drucker, 1954: 
40). The end product of technological innovation may thus not be a technology itself, but will 
embody at least some new technology or technical advance. 
Technological Innovation as Resource and Capability Combination 
The resource-based view sees the firm as a bundle or coalition of resources (Barney, 1991; 
Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a; Peteraf, 1993). In the bargaining perspective, a firm’s legal shell 
contains a co-specialized bundle of resources and capabilities (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a). 
“A resource is an observable (but not necessarily tangible) asset that can be valued and traded – 
such as a brand, a patent, a parcel of land” (Hoopes et al., 2003: 890; Makadok, 2001) or a 
technology. On the other hand, a capability “is not observable (and hence necessarily 
intangible), cannot be valued and changes hands only as part of its entire unit” (ibid.). 
Danneels (2002) considers the development of an innovation as entailing the “linking” of 
technological and customer capabilities within a firm. In a similar way, we conceptualize 
technological innovation as the outcome of the combination of resources and capabilities, 
including new technology, technical and market capabilities, and other firm resources, within 
or across firms (Clark, 1987; Danneels, 2002; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004). In other words, the 
creation of products embodying new technologies will require a process of combination of at 
least the following series of distinct resources and capabilities: the new technology, firm 
technical capabilities, firm market capabilities, and other firm resources/capabilities. Each of 
these may exist within the firm to varying degrees, and thus may have to be augmented via 
learning or acquisition from beyond the firm’s boundaries. This view is summarized in Figure 1. 
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As the figure shows, technological innovation entails the combination of new technology with 
other firm resources. This integrative linking requires the application of a firm’s technical and 
market capabilities (Clark, 1987). Thus the value of the innovative product created by a given 
firm will also depend on the quality of the technical and market capabilities (and other firm 
resources) brought into play in its creation (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). 
The depiction of a “semi-permeable” firm boundary permits the consideration of technological 
innovation based on externally sourced new technology as one case of the more general 
phenomenon of technological innovation. Nevertheless, regardless of whether the new technology 
is sourced internally or externally, internal resources and capabilities remain critical. 
Finally, the dotted feedback arrows in Figure 1 reflect firms’ ability to improve their capabilities 
by learning from both internal and external sources. Successful innovation leads to greater 
learning, as some necessary technical or market capabilities may have to be sourced from 
outside the firm (Danneels, 2002), and over time firms may develop expertise in given 
technological or/and market domains (Nerkar and Roberts, 2004). 
As an illustration, we can consider radio frequency identification (RFID) a new technology that 
consists of minute semiconductor chips which, when implanted in various materials, can 
wirelessly emit signals containing information such as identification numbers, age (of the chip), 
location etc. Imagine that Wal-Mart were to implant such devices in customers’ loyalty cards. 
On entering a store, a bearer of one of these cards might receive information on new arrivals, 
discounts and rebates etc. on her mobile device, based on previous purchasing history.
4 To 
create this innovative service, Wal-Mart would require not only the acquisition of the RFID-
enabled cards (the new technology) but would also need to get customers to sign-on to the 
service, capture customer data as well as all its own supply chain data in its information 
systems, possibly sign agreements with wireless telephony operators, inform key privacy rights 
groups, etc. Thus, without the deployment of other vital resources and capabilities, the new 
technology on its own would not lead to successful technological innovation. 
Two implications of this approach arise. Firstly, technological innovation does not require the 
innovating firm to be a technology firm itself. Technological innovation can be based on 
externally sourced technology, once it is embodied in firm products or processes, and forms 
their locus of novelty. Secondly, differing degrees of complementarity between the new 
technology and other firm resources, means that different bundles of co-specialized resources 
and capabilities (firms) may create differing amounts of value when they innovate based on the 
same technology. Thus firm i might use externally sourced technology to create a surplus ∆Vi , 
while firm j uses the same technology to create ∆Vj where ∆Vj > ∆Vi, because firm j’s bundle of 
co-specialized resources exhibits greater complementarity to the new technology. 
Capability Exploitation and Exploration in Technological Innovation 
In order to explore the role that capability differences play when firms have access to the same 
external technologies, we characterize technological innovation in terms of the degree to which 
it builds on current firm capabilities, or requires the learning of new ones. 
Our characterization follows Danneels (2002) and Dougherty (1992), who view innovation as a 
process of linking technologies and markets. Since innovative products embody specific 
                                              
4 This idea exists only in our imagination as far as we know.  
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technologies and are directed at specific markets, they “constitute the integration of markets 
and technologies” (Dougherty, 1992: 78) and thus depend heavily on firms’ underlying market 
and technical capabilities. To the extent that a technological innovation requires technical or 
market capabilities in which a firm is deficient, its successful creation entails the learning of the 
necessary capabilities, and for this reason innovation is also a mechanism for organizational 
renewal (Danneels, 2002; Dougherty, 1992). 
This learning can be exploratory or exploitative, (March, 1991) depending on the extent to 
which it builds on capabilities in which a firm is already proficient. Thus, although in terms of 
its tangible output innovation always connotes some novelty and “exploration,” at the level of 
the technical and market capabilities called into play in its creation, learning can range from 
“pure exploitation” to “pure exploration” (Danneels, 2002: 1105; March, 1991). Therefore 
applying Danneels’s typology to our definition of technological innovation we distinguish 
between  exploitative, technical capability leveraging, market capability leveraging, and 
exploratory technological innovation, as summarized
5 in Figure 2. 

















      Technical 
Strong 
capabilities 








As Figure 2 shows, when a new technology belongs to a technological domain in which a firm 
has strong technical capabilities, and it is embodied in a product that addresses a market for 
which the firm has well-developed capabilities, then we refer to an exploitative technological 
innovation. If however a firm has weak technical capabilities in the relevant technological 
domain, and weak market capabilities for the customers addressed, then we refer to an 
exploratory technological innovation. In the first case the firm’s innovation exploits both its 
current technical and market capabilities while in the second case it explores new technical and 
market capabilities. 
On the other hand, when a technological innovation is exploitative of market capabilities but 
explorative in terms of technical capabilities, we refer to it as a market capability leveraging 
technological innovation. Similarly, a technical capability leveraging technological innovation 
                                              
5 Adapted from Danneels (2002).  
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occurs when firm capabilities are strong in the relevant technological domain but weak in the 
market addressed. 
It should be noted that this characterization of technological innovation is relative to the 
capabilities of a focal innovating firm. Heterogeneous resource and capability endowments 
coupled with path dependency (Barney, 1991), can cause what constitutes an exploitative 
technological innovation for one firm to constitute, say, a market capability leveraging 
innovation for another. For example, pharmaceutical firms have to allocate limited R&D dollars 
across many subfields of biotechnology. Thus the development of a new drug based on published 
advances in a given subfield (e.g. gene sequencing) could be an exploitative innovation for a 
given pharmaceutical firm that has invested heavily in basic research in that area, if the drug is 
directed at a therapeutic market (e.g. breast cancer patients) with which it has extensive 
experience. However, the development of a drug based on the same scientific advances can 
constitute a market capability leveraging innovation for some other pharmaceutical firm that has 
modest expertise in gene sequencing, but intends to use it to develop drugs for breast cancer 
patients, a therapeutic market with which it is very familiar as well. 
Nevertheless, one can also imagine situations where the knowledge-base and learning 
characteristics of a technological innovation are similar for all or most firms in a particular 
market. In this line, for instance, one could argue that the provision of Internet-based banking 
services for major corporate clients was an exploitative technological innovation for most large 
banks which had already invested heavily in information/communication technologies. 
Our typology can also be related to work by Katila and Ahuja (2002) who consider firms’ 
“search depth” and “search scope” in new product introduction. While our focus on the degree 
of capability learning required by an innovation can be considered analogous to their 
dimension of “search depth,” we go beyond technological “search” to consider the market 
dimension as well. 
Another important study, by Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001), considers whether firm exploration 
spans technological and/or organizational boundaries. In our case, the focus on external sourcing 
of new technologies means that organizational boundaries are always spanned. However, 
technological boundaries may or may not be spanned; as such new technologies may belong 
to technological domains in which firms already have strong capabilities. In addition, along with 
technological characteristics, our typology also considers the extent to which market capability 
boundaries are “spanned” as well. 
Using our characterization, we consider a firm’s innovation strategy in terms of which 
technologies it chooses to access externally, and which markets it chooses to deploy them in. 
In  other words, a firm’s innovation strategy determines whether it pursues exploitative, 
exploratory, or market/technical capability leveraging technological innovation. While previous 
work has considered the implications of innovation strategy for innovativeness and the level of 
innovative output observed, we focus on how this choice affects the amount a firm stands to 
appropriate from the value created by such innovative output. 
Next we briefly review research on the dimensions of absorptive capacity, before going on 
to show how these interact with a firm’s innovation strategy to shape value appropriation.  
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Dimensions of Absorptive Capacity 
Absorptive capacity was introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) as a critical factor in 
firms’ attempts to utilize external knowledge to spur internal innovation. Defining absorptive 
capacity as a firm’s ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it 
to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), they argued that it was largely a function of 
prior related knowledge, and was critical for firms’ innovative capabilities. Absorptive capacity 
has since been very widely used as a predictor of innovative output at firm (e.g. Cockburn and 
Henderson, 1998; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996), inter-firm (e.g. Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; 
Lane, Salk, and Lyles, 2001), and intra-firm (e.g. Lenox and King, 2004; Tsai, 2001) levels. 
Recently however, Zahra and George proposed conceptualizing absorptive capacity as a dynamic 
capability (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003), “pertaining 
to knowledge creation and utilization” (Zahra and George, 2002: 185). They suggested considering 
it as consisting of the four dimensions of knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and 
exploitation. In their scheme, knowledge acquisition and assimilation constitute potential absorptive 
capacity, while knowledge transformation and exploitation constitute realized absorptive capacity. 
Zahra and George argue that their “reconceptualization” will help to focus empirical attention 
on potential absorptive capacity, which they believe has been neglected in previous work, 
relative to realized absorptive capacity. They also hold that conceptualizing absorptive capacity 
as a dynamic capability helps to relate the construct more closely to broader research on firm 
capabilities within the RBV. Finally, they believe that viewing absorptive capacity as a dynamic 
capability makes it more “amenable to change through managerial actions that redefine and 
deploy the firm’s knowledge-based assets” (2002: 186). 
It could be argued that in Zahra and George’s scheme, while other dimensions are accounted 
for, the knowledge valuation dimension as well as the domain-specific nature of absorptive 
capacity (both emphasized by Cohen and Levinthal), are not very explicit. Nevertheless, their 
approach has other advantages for research on firm capabilities in general, and for this paper in 
particular. Firstly their conceptualization of absorptive capacity as a dynamic capability is very 
useful for our focus on the capabilities underlying technological innovation. Since dynamic 
capabilities act upon firms’ “zero-level” capabilities (Winter, 2003), we expect them to interact 
with the capability-learning characteristics of technological innovation (Winter, 2000b) in 
determining value appropriation. Secondly, Zahra and George’s approach helps to shed light on 
possible loci of differences in absorptive capacity endowments between firms. Inter-firm 
variation in absorptive capacity can arise as some firms invest more heavily in potential than 
realized absorptive capacity or vice-versa (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, and Volberda, 2005). 
In this paper, we focus on the distinct roles of potential and realized absorptive capacity, 
relating  both of them to value appropriation. While most previous work has considered 
absorptive capacity as a driver of innovative capabilities and innovative output (Zahra and 
George, 2002), we suggest that absorptive capacity can also act as an appropriation 
mechanism. 
Appropriating Value From External Technology 
To address value appropriation from technological innovation based on externally sourced 
technology, we consider a double-sided strategic factor market for new technologies (Arora  
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et al., 2001; Barney, 1986). Barney defines a strategic factor market as “a market where the 
resources necessary to implement a strategy are acquired” (1986: 1231). Hence in this case 
the strategy in question is technological innovation, while the necessary resource is a new 
technology. 
Our double-sided market has suppliers of technology on one side, and firms seeking to embody 
new technologies in products and processes on the other (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a; 
Adegbesan, 2005). The technologies available vary in their supply and may span multiple 
technological domains. While technology suppliers seek to sell to firms with which they can 
create the most value, innovating firms seek to acquire valuable technology at the best possible 
price. Nevertheless, innovating firms are also in competition amongst themselves, as they seek 
superior performance through innovative products and services directed at various markets. 
Innovating firms are regarded as heterogeneous bundles of resources and capabilities exhibiting 
some degree of co-specialization (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a). Since technological innovation 
requires the combination of new technology and other firm resources and capabilities, 
innovating firms vary in their complementarity to the new technologies available. 
When technical advancement leads to the appearance of a particular new technology in 
the market, a number of firms may seek to incorporate it in innovative products or services. The 
number of firms seeking to innovate with the technology will depend on the firms’ innovation 
strategies and the availability of the technology in question. How then is the value created with 
this new technology shared between innovating firms and technology suppliers? Additionally, 
how does value appropriation vary across individual innovating firms? 
Bargaining Over Value in Strategic Factor Markets 
We analyze the determinants of value appropriation, drawing on work by Adegbesan (2005) 
that extends strategic factor market theory (Barney, 1986; Makadok and Barney, 2001) to 
account for situations where buyers display varying degrees of complementarity to target 
resources (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a). The prevalent view in research on strategic factor 
markets has been that firms cannot appropriate gains from the deployment of valuable 
resources unless they have superior expectations about their future value, or they benefit from 
luck (Ahuja et al., 2005; Barney, 1986; Denrell et al., 2003; Makadok and Barney, 2001). 
Nevertheless, despite its broad acceptance, this conclusion is true only when there are no 
complementarities between resources (Adegbesan, 2005; Barney, 1988; Conner, 1991; Lippman 
and Rumelt, 2003a). 
When there are no complementarities between resources, if the value of a resource R1 on its 
own is v(R1) and the value of another resource R2 is v(R2), then in combination their value is at 
most v(R1∪ R2) = v(R1) + v(R2). Thus v(R1) would be the marginal productivity of R1 in the 
combination, and Barney’s (1986) logic holds: unless the supplier of R1 doesn’t know what it is 
worth (asymmetric information), the owner of R2 cannot pay less than v(R1) for the services 
of R1. As such, a resource buyer cannot get more than she pays for. 
However, when there is some degree of co-specialization (complementarity) between the 
resources, their combination is “superadditive,” and v(R1∪R2) = v(R1) + v(R2) + ∆V where ∆V > 0 
(Adegbesan, 2005; Thomke and Kuemmerle, 2002). The magnitude of the surplus created (∆V) is 
proportional to the degree of complementarity between the resources. It does not “belong” 
to either resource, but results from their combination, and the way it is split between them  
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is therefore indeterminate ex ante. Thus if the owner of R2 is able to appropriate a positive share 
of the surplus ∆V, she can realize gains to trade even if she had to pay v(R1) for the services of R1. 
Adegbesan (2005) builds on the bargaining perspective to show that the portion of surplus 
captured by each player depends on the joint effects of the relative supply/demand of seller and 
buyer groups; the relative degree of complementarity between individual buyers and target 
resources; and the bargaining ability of individual buyers relative to individual resource 
suppliers. 
This is illustrated
6 in Figure 3 in the context of technological innovation by a firm j using new 
technology from a supplier i. The surplus so created (∆Vij) is split between them such that ∆Vij = 
ui + vj. Adegbesan (2005) formally shows that some of the surplus will be guaranteed to the 
scarcer partner in proportion to the value it could create with the most valuable unmatched 
player ( 0 δ ); some will be guaranteed to the bidding partner in proportion to its superior 
complementarity relative to its least valuable matched peer (∆Vij -  1 δ ); and a final portion is 
split within each pair, according to the partners’ relative bargaining ability ( 0 1 δ δ − ). Thus, all else 
being equal, the greater a partner’s relative scarcity, superior complementarity, or relative 
bargaining ability, the greater the amount of value it will appropriate. 









We use this bargaining model to link firms’ innovation strategies and absorptive capacity 
endowments to the amount of value they can appropriate from external technology. In particular 
we focus on the mediating impact of relative complementarity, as illustrated in Figure 4. Firm 
first-order as well as dynamic capabilities determine their ability to create value with specific 
technologies in specific markets, and thus their degree of complementarity. Since firms with 
superior complementarity stand to appropriate more value, the decision of which technologies to 
source and which markets to deploy them in will interact with capability endowments to produce 
value appropriation outcomes. 
 
 
                                              
6 Illustration from Adegbesan (2005). 
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complementarity 
Scarcity premium  Bargaining 
ability 
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Capabilities, Learning, and Value Appropriation 
Innovation based on externally sourced technology requires the acquisition and assimilation of 
new technologies, as well as their transformation and embodiment in products directed at 
specific markets. Firm technical and market capabilities are essential for effectively absorbing 
new technology, combining it with other resources and capabilities, and exploiting it in 
products that create value for customers (Danneels, 2002; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004). 
When firms have well-developed technical cap a b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  s a m e  d o m a i n  a s  a  n e w  
technology, they are able to speedily and efficiently acquire and assimilate it, as a result of 
their minimal learning requirements (Zahra and George, 2002). Their similar knowledge base, 
and their highly honed routines for working with technologies in that domain, will lead to 
innovations of high technical quality (Clark, 1987). 
Similarly, when they have well-developed competencies in the market addressed, they are able 
to transform and exploit new technologies in products that create superior value. Their deep 
understanding of customer needs, along with their refined marketing capabilities, permit them 
to transform new technologies into products that customers value highly (Clark, 1987; 
Danneels, 2002). In other words, firms pursuing exploitative technological innovation are able 
to create products of a high technical quality that satisfy real customer needs in the markets 
addressed, and thus display a high degree of complementarity. 
However, when firms pursue capability leveraging technological innovation, the innovation 
process requires them to augment their technical or market capabilities through learning 
(Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Unlike firms that have highly honed routines for working in 
given technological domains or markets, firms that have to learn while on the job will not be as 
effective in producing innovations of high technical quality or market value. Thus firms that 
pursue capability leveraging technological innovation will exhibit less complementarity than 
firms pursuing exploitative technological innovation, but greater complementarity than firms 
pursuing exploratory technological innovation. As such: 
Innovation Based on 
External Technology 




Relative Bargaining Ability 
Innovation Strategy 
Dimensions of Absorptive Capacity  
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Proposition 1: When firms embody a new technology in successful products addressing a 
given market, those firms pursuing exploitative technological innovation will appropriate 
more value than firms pursuing capability leveraging technological innovation, and the 
latter will appropriate more value than firms pursuing exploratory technological 
innovation. 
Although value appropriation is maximized by following a strategy of exploitative 
technological innovation, firms may trade appropriation benefits for learning benefits, in order 
to avoid competency traps (March, 1991) associated with excessive exploitation. Thus it is not 
enough to look at how appropriation varies across strategies, but it is also important to 
consider its variation within particular innovation strategies. Given the choice of a particular 
innovation strategy, what determines a firm’s ability to appropriate superior value? 
Market capability leveraging technological innovation. Firms pursuing market capability 
leveraging technological innovation seek to exploit their capabilities in a given market, while 
exploring new technical capabilities. As a result of their strong market capabilities, such firms 
will have a good knowledge of customer needs and preferences, in addition to complementary 
resources for addressing such a market (Clark, 1987). 
Nevertheless, their lack of prior related technological knowledge can hamper efforts to acquire 
and assimilate the new technology, while their established technological routines can act as 
core rigidities in working with the new technology (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Leonard-
Barton, 1992). Additionally, poor capabilities in the new technological domain can make it 
difficult for them to accurately assess technical requirements, while increasing the required 
search scope for technological learning (Danneels, 2002; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). 
These problems can be reduced considerably if firms have strong knowledge acquisition and 
assimilation capabilities. Firms with well-developed knowledge acquisition capabilities are more 
receptive to new technological knowledge (Zahra and George, 2002). They are faster at 
incorporating new information into their knowledge-bases, and are more intense in their 
knowledge acquisition efforts (Kim, 1997). Additionally, firms with strong knowledge 
assimilation capabilities are better able to analyze, process, interpret, and understand new 
technologies (Zahra and George, 2002). They are also better able to overcome differences in the 
heuristics underlying new technologies, as well as problems arising from their context 
specificity (Szulanski, 1996). 
Consequently, firms with superior knowledge acquisition and assimilation capabilities will be 
better able to create value with market capability leveraging technological innovation. Since these 
two capabilities comprise potential absorptive capacity, it follows that firms with superior 
potential absorptive capacity will display superior complementarity to market capability 
leveraging technological innovation. (This scenario is depicted in the top right square of Figure 5). 
Proposition 2: When firms pursuing market capability leveraging technological innovation 
embody a new technology in successful products addressing a given market, firms with 
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Technical capability leveraging technological innovation. Technical capability leveraging 
technological innovation entails the exploration of new market capabilities and the exploitation 
of technical capabilities. Firms with highly developed capabilities in a technological domain 
will more easily assimilate new technologies in that domain (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). They 
will have superior design and engineering know-how, will have well-established routines for 
working with similar technologies, and will be better able to evaluate the technical feasibility 
and resource requirements for working with new technologies in that domain (Clark, 1987; 
Danneels, 2002). 
However, their poorer market capability endowments will impede the accurate evaluation of 
market characteristics, customer preferences, and prevailing purchase procedures (Danneels, 
2002). They may also lack the capacity to manage market-specific distribution, sales, and 
customer communication channels (Clark, 1987). In addition to the lack of complementary 
resources for addressing customers, market capability learning will require a broader scope of 
search than would otherwise have been the case (Katila and Ahuja, 2002). 
These problems can be greatly alleviated by firms’ knowledge transformation and exploitation 
capabilities. Firms with well-developed knowledge transformation capabilities are better able to 
cross-apply existing knowledge to new market applications (Zahra and George, 2002). Through 
the process of “bisociation,” transformation capabilities facilitate the recognition of new 
opportunities and enable firms to see themselves and their competitive landscape in new ways, 
thus easing the generation of new market competencies (Koestler, 1966; Zahra and George, 
2002). Similarly, knowledge exploitation capabilities help firms to refine, extend, and leverage 
existing competencies (Zahra and George, 2002). Through knowledge exploitation, firms can 
create new market capabilities by incorporating transformed knowledge into operations (Jansen 
et al., 2005). In addition, exploitation capabilities enable firms to retrieve previously 
learned/stored knowledge which may be useful in new situations; as well as to use market, 
customer, and competitor knowledge to create new competencies (Zahra and George, 2002). 
Since knowledge transformation and exploitation capabilities comprise realized absorptive 
capacity, it therefore follows that firms with superior realized absorptive capacity will display  
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superior complementarity to technical capability leveraging technological innovation (bottom 
left square of Figure 5). 
Proposition 3: When firms pursuing technical capability leveraging technological 
innovation embody a new technology in successful products addressing a given market, 
firms with superior realized absorptive capacity will appropriate more value than other 
innovating firms. 
Exploratory technological innovation. Firms pursuing exploratory technological innovation face 
the problems associated with the exploration of technical capabilities simultaneously with those 
associated with market capability exploration. As such, in order to cope effectively, they require 
well-developed knowledge acquisition and assimilation capabilities, as well as strong 
knowledge transformation and exploitation capabilities. Thus complementarity will be driven 
by both potential and realized absorptive capacity. Consequently, firms with superior 
endowments of potential absorptive capacity and realized absorptive capacity will outperform 
other firms pursuing exploratory technological innovation (bottom right square of Figure 5). 
Proposition 4: When firms pursuing exploratory technological innovation embody a new 
technology in successful products addressing a given market, firms with superior potential 
and realized absorptive capacity will appropriate more value than other innovating firms. 
Innovating for suppliers. Finally, there are two situations when innovating firms may not vary 
significantly in complementarity. Firstly, when firms pursuing exploratory technological 
innovation have similar levels of absorptive capacity, they will not vary greatly in their ability 
to tackle the challenges highlighted earlier with respect to market and technical capability 
exploration. As such, there will be little variation in their ability to create value and they will 
exhibit comparable complementarity (or lack thereof). 
Secondly, when firms pursue exploitative technological innovation, they will all be able to 
speedily and efficiently acquire and assimilate a new technology (Clark, 1987; Danneels, 2002). 
In addition, they will all have a good knowledge of customer needs and preferences, along with 
strong capabilities of addressing a given market (ibid). As such, though they may all create very 
valuable innovations, they will not differ greatly amongst themselves in complementarity. 
Adegbesan (2005) shows that when innovating firms are similar in complementarity,  ij V ∆  in 
Figure 3 will not vary significantly across firms, such that  0 1 δ δ ≈ ≈ ∆ ij V . As a consequence, in 
the absence of unlimited technology supply, most of the value created by innovation will be 
appropriated by technology suppliers. As such we expect that 
Proposition 5a: When firms with similar levels of absorptive capacity pursuing 
exploratory technological innovation embody a new technology in successful products 
addressing a given market, a disproportionate share of the returns will be appropriated by 
suppliers of the new technology. 
Proposition 5b: When firms pursuing exploitative technological innovation embody a new 
technology in successful products addressing a given market, a disproportionate share of 
the returns will be appropriated by suppliers of the new technology.  
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Discussion 
Our findings in this paper suggest that a firm’s ability to appropriate value from external 
technology depends on the fit between its innovation strategy and its investments in various 
dimensions of absorptive capacity. Firms pursuing exploitative technological innovation are 
better able to appropriate value than firms pursuing other innovation strategies (Proposition 1), 
but they are also more vulnerable to competency traps. Excessive exploitation to the point of 
strategic similarity shifts appropriation from innovating firms to technology suppliers 
(Proposition 5b). Thus what was the best strategy for appropriation could become the worst, if 
pursued by many firms. 
Innovating firms may therefore give up some present appropriation gains for future 
appropriation (learning) gains by pursuing capability leveraging technological innovation. 
However, when firms do this, the lack of distinctive capability excellence shifts the locus of 
appropriation to excellence in dynamic capabilities (Propositions 2, 3, and 4). As such, when 
firms pursue market capability leveraging technological innovation, those with superior 
potential absorptive capacity will profit most (Proposition 2); and when they pursue 
technological capability leveraging technological innovation, those with superior realized 
absorptive capacity will profit most (Proposition 3). 
When firms pursue (purely) exploratory technological innovation, those with superior 
complementarity will be the firms that exhibit both superior potential and realized absorptive 
capacity. However, it is difficult for firms to outperform all their peers on both counts. Hence 
there could very easily be strategic similarity among firms pursuing exploratory technological 
innovation, either because they equally exhibit poor complementarity, or because some firms’ 
excellence in potential absorptive capacity is matched by other firms’ excellence in realized 
absorptive capacity. Thus, while exploratory technological innovation potentially has the 
greatest learning gains, it can also result in handing over value appropriation to technology 
suppliers (Proposition 5a). 
Consequently value appropriation (and hence performance) is not driven by new technologies 
per se, but by the capabilities and dynamic capabilities firms use to mold them into concrete 
products directed at specific markets. 
These clarifications are important in view of the excitement over the possibilities for increased 
innovation provided by the proliferation of knowledge workers and the rise of markets for 
technology. The focus on increasing innovativeness often overlooks the question of who 
benefits from increases in innovative output. As Winter has pointed out, “no matter how great 
the technology or how big the market for it, there is no guarantee that the value from a new 
technology will go to the innovator” (Winter, 2000a: 242). 
Poor appropriation may also explain current managerial dissatisfaction with returns on 
innovation. For example, a recent global study by the Boston Consulting Group found that less 
than half of executives surveyed were satisfied with returns on innovation; and concluded that 
“the unspoken truth seems to be that for a very large number of companies, innovation 
spending continues to rise, but it is generating neither enough profit nor competitive 
advantage” (Andrew, 2005: 7). 
With the previous emphasis on internal R&D, firms that created new technology often also 
embodied them in innovative products and services. Thus most previous research focused on 
factors affecting imitability and value appropriation for the technology supplier. However, with  
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the rise of markets for technology and the “open innovation” paradigm, it becomes critical to 
analyze how firms can appropriate value from external technology which is often also 
accessible to their competitors. 
In this line, we emphasize the importance of the interaction between innovation strategy and 
investments in potential and/or realized absorptive capacity. Firms need to invest in absorptive 
capacity in line with their innovation strategies, and/or derive their innovation strategies in 
view of their absorptive capacity endowments. Firms should also direct their innovation 
strategies towards the development of technical and market capabilities for future value 
appropriation. 
Thus innovation should not be seen only in terms of new technologies and innovative output, 
but more specifically in terms of building, linking, and leveraging first-order capabilities and 
dynamic capabilities across technologies and markets. Whereas an excessive focus on particular 
technologies benefits suppliers, a focus on the idiosyncratic market and technical capabilities 
for molding new technologies into products, provides firms with a locus of differentiation and 
value appropriation. 
Despite the current emphasis on external sourcing, it is important to remember that superior 
appropriation is impossible in the absence of heterogeneity (Peteraf, 1993), and so firms cannot 
“buy” competitive advantage (Barney, 1989; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Thus we suggest that 
rather than outside, the locus of superior performance is moving deeper inside the firm, to the 
fit between higher order capabilities and external resources. When a few firms could control 
the  best technologies in-house, their technological superiority served to differentiate them. 
However, as technological frontiers have migrated beyond the control of any group of firms, 
market, as well as technical, capabilities have become key. We suggest that to the extent (or in 
domains where) firms exhibit similar capabilities, the locus of appropriation shifts to superiority 
in dynamic capabilities. Even so, it is “not necessarily advantageous for a firm to invest in … 
dynamic capabilities” (Winter, 2003: 993). In other words, their being “dynamic” alone doesn’t 
necessarily make them more valuable. We show that appropriation depends on which dynamic 
capabilities are involved, when, and whether competitors exhibit them or not. 
For this reason we also believe that Zahra and George’s (2002) reconceptualization of 
absorptive capacity is useful, because by breaking it into its constituent parts we can see that 
absorptive capacity is not a “rule for riches.” The ability to profit from external knowledge does 
not always improve performance, but depends on the locus of that ability (potential or realized), 
as well as on whether others display it or not. Performance is improved when absorptive 
capacity is present in a dimension that creates value in a given context, and when it is 
possessed by one firm to a greater degree than by other firms in that context. Thus the fact that 
absorptive capacity is a good predictor of innovative output doesn’t necessarily mean it will 
predict performance (as measured by value appropriation) equally well. 
In fact our study suggests that innovative output might be problematic as a proxy for the 
performance outcomes of various firm strategies. Although there are very good reasons for its 
usage (e.g. it is relatively easy to measure, and it is often difficult to get other proxies), our 
study calls for caution, because the level of innovative output can be endogenous to firm 
innovation strategies (for example when firms give up present innovation performance for 
learning gains). This problem, however, can be alleviated by using longitudinal measures of 
innovative output, since true learning gains should eventually show up in improved 
performance at some point in time.  
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Our findings also suggest that when innovating firms are similar in their ability to create value 
with a technology, those who smile all the way to the bank will be the technology suppliers. 
This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that during the Internet boom at the end of the 
1990s, mature firms that sought to become “e-businesses” en masse, benefited much less than 
the technology firms and consultancies that “enabled” their e-business strategies. When new 
technologies are touted to boost the value creating ability of all firms, “techies” rather than 
innovating companies will probably be the ones to get rich (Winter, 2000a). 
From a methodological standpoint, our study highlights the utility of the integration of 
cooperative game theory into the RBV, represented by the recent bargaining perspective on 
resource advantage (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a). By viewing firms as coalitions of resources 
and capabilities that exhibit some degree of co-specialization, we were able to conceptualize 
technological innovation in terms of the combination of resources and capabilities of varying 
complementarity, within or across firm boundaries. This in turn allowed us to characterize 
innovation strategy in terms of its capability learning (Winter, 2000b) characteristics. We also 
drew on related work (Adegbesan, 2005) that uses the bargaining perspective to examine 
strategic factor markets characterized by resource complementarity. This enabled us to shed 
light on value appropriation, which is an under-researched area in strategy in general, and the 
RBV in particular (Coff and Lee, 2003). 
Our use of the bargaining perspective, however, has a limitation which this approach shares 
with cooperative game-theoretic approaches in general. In the bargaining perspective, the 
amount of surplus created is assumed to be known, in order to focus on how heterogeneous 
resource endowments affect firms’ ability to lay claim to it. In other words, “surplus is known, 
but its division is subject to negotiation” (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003: 1070). Thus in our case, 
players know those firms to which the new technology is more valuable, and this is used to 
bargain in each player’s interest. Nevertheless, since our theory concerns the drivers of value 
appropriated, our results depend not on the knowledge of the exact amount of value created by 
various combinations, but on the particular knowledge of which players are more valuable than 
others, and to what extent. 
Knowledge characteristics are an underdeveloped aspect of cooperative game theory 
(Brandenburger and Stuart, 2004), but this may still be a small price to pay for the power of the 
coalitional approach. In this paper for example, we are able to investigate multi-level 
appropriation, focusing not only on differences in value appropriation between innovating 
firms and technology suppliers, but also on differential appropriation amongst innovating firms 
themselves. Thus using the bargaining perspective, we capture both firm- and industry-level 
variation in value appropriation. 
Future research could further explore differential effects of the dimensions of absorptive 
capacity. Apart from Jansen et al. (2005) who study antecedents of the various dimensions, 
there is almost no published work that explores if, when, and how, heterogeneous endowments 
in the various dimensions of absorptive capacity could affect firm performance. In addition, 
although research on capabilities in general, and dynamic capabilities in particular is 
“a particularly important theme” (Hoopes et al., 2003: 897) in the RBV, we need more work that 
goes beyond merely relating dynamic capabilities to performance, to distinguishing which 
dynamic capabilities are important in which contexts. Finally, the tradeoffs involved in 
choosing innovation strategies highlight the importance and need for research capable of 
capturing learning benefits in performance measures. Otherwise, the “net present performance” 
of firms which invest in learning will be underestimated, while the performance of firms that 
exploit present opportunities without preparing for the future will be over-estimated.  
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In summary, our findings call for strategic navigation of technology markets opened up by the 
acceleration of technical advancement and the rise in the number and mobility of knowledge 
workers. “Open innovation” has been defined as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows 
of  knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of 
innovation, respectively” (Chesbrough, 2006: 1). We suggest that while firms may profitably use 
the new markets to exploit under-utilized in-house technologies, they should be much more 
circumspect about the technologies they source and where they deploy them, as not every 
technology is equally “good” for every firm. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have explored the drivers of value appropriation when firms innovate based on 
external new technologies. Building on the recent bargaining perspective on resource 
advantage, we conceptualized technological innovation in terms of the combination of 
resources and capabilities within and across firms. By focusing on the interactions between the 
various dimensions of absorptive capacity, and the capability-learning characteristics of various 
innovation strategies, we were thus able to show when firms innovating based on external 
technologies would appropriate more value than other innovating firms; and when technology 
suppliers would appropriate more value than innovating firms.  
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